andyalan10 wrote:When people in the past have said "by having two holdings I reduce the chances of a company specific disaster" I have always muttered under my breath "yes and you halve the benefit of a company specific boost" such as a takeover or whatever.
To deal with a minor point first, "by having two holdings I reduce the chances of a company specific disaster" is plain wrong - as observed later in the thread, you double those chances. But I assume what they actually say is "by having two holdings I reduce the
impact of a company specific disaster", and that's correct: you halve that impact. And yes, exactly the same applies if you substitute "boost" for "disaster".
But: exactly the same also applies if you substitute "sector" for "company" with appropriate consequential changes: "by having holdings in two sectors I halve the impact (and double the chances) of a sector specific disaster" and "by having holdings in two sectors I halve the impact (and double the chances) of a sector specific boost" are just as true. So if your argument implies that there's no point to diversifying into more than one company in a sector, then equally it implies that there's no point to diversifying into more than one sector... So why not just put your entire capital into the single share you think best?
Which is of course an absurd conclusion - but why is it absurd? Well, let's imagine someone thought that way in the spring of 2008. They might have thought that Lloyds was the best share around - and they'd have suffered a major disaster: even with Lloyds back to paying dividends and having a decent yield now, both capital and income would be a pretty small fraction of what they started with. Or they might have thought that Persimmon was the best share around - and they'd have experienced a major boost, with both capital and income several times what they started with. The first outcome is far worse and the second outcome far better than how a well-diversified HYP would have performed.
Equally, the owner of the well-diversified HYP might have chosen Lloyds, Persimmon, both or neither for it, and accordingly experienced either or both of those outcomes with one of its holdings - but the proportional impact of each on their entire HYP would only have been 1/15th as much (assuming a 15-share HYP). So capital and income of the HYP would have experienced a setback, a boost or both, but at nothing like either the "small fraction" or "several times" level...
What it all comes down to is: investing in a shares portfolio inevitably involves a gamble that one's own judgement about which are the right shares to be invested in will be good enough to achieve one's investment aims. One can't avoid making such a gamble (except by choosing something other than shares to be invested in, and that only replaces "the right shares" by "the right investments"), but one can decide how big to make the gamble. The totally-undiversified strategy of putting everything into a single share is a big gamble: get the share right and you win big, get it wrong and you lose big. A 15-share HYP is a smaller gamble, with both plausible wins and plausible losses considerably reduced in comparison.
Which is all stuff I think you basically 'get', given your later statement that "
I think what I am saying is that diversification across 15 or so sectors and shares is enough in itself to mitigate the effects of single company problems without the need for also holding multiple shares per sector." But I think it's worth saying, partly because others might not, partly because it points out that the benefit of diversifying is that it reduces the variability of the outcomes (rather than improving the average outcome), and partly because it points out that the question of how much one wants to reduce that variability (and hence how much one wants to diversify) is an investor-specific question: the right answer for me is not necessarily the right answer for you!
That's partly for objective reasons, especially to do with what proportion of one's income comes from one's HYP and how badly that income is needed. Even a small chance of losing 25% of one's HYP's income is a fairly serious problem if one needs almost all of one's income and the HYP provides the vast majority of it, but much less serious if one has a good deal more income than one actually needs, if the HYP provides only a small proportion of one's income, or both.
But it's also partly for subjective reasons: whether rightly or wrongly, some people are more happy-go-lucky about such things. So even if I knew a good deal more about your financial circumstances than I do, I still wouldn't be able to tell you just how much diversification you want!
The above also provides some insight into the question of "doubling up" in sectors. A company in a new sector reduces the impact of both company-specific and sector-specific events (both disasters and boosts); a second company in an existing sector only significantly reduces the impact of company-specific events (*). So the second company in an existing sector does noticeably less to cut down the variability of outcomes than the company in a new sector. I.e. "doubling up" does improve diversification benefits, but by quite a bit less than a new sector does. Furthermore, if one goes into the maths of such things, the improvement tails off quite rapidly as the existing level of diversification rises (**). So essentially, I expect every HYPer to find a number of holdings at which they consider the benefits of further diversification to be negligible (and in particular, not worth the extra admin involved), and that number will be rather smaller with regard to "doubling up" than with regard to new sectors.
However, all of that is basically with regard to choosing a HYP bought with a lump sum or over quite a short period, during which market conditions don't change much. For HYPs built over longer periods, changing market conditions will mean that some sectors that did contain plausible HYP candidates no longer do (for instance, the financial sectors did contain quite a few of them in 2005, but by 2010 they contained few (if any!); the telecoms sector didn't contain any in 2000 but by 2005 it contained at least a couple). Which is good news for those with a taste for more diversification, as it means that with time, patience and not being too keen on selling off holdings that have lost their HYP qualifications (***), they can build up a more sector-diversified HYP than they could with a HYP bought over a shorter period.
The same sort of thing can happen for companies within sectors. A really big example of that is BP and Shell over 2009 and 2010: in 2009, they were fairly evenly-matched as HYP candidates, and a HYPer might very well have chosen BP out of the two; by mid-late 2010, BP had clearly completely lost its HYP credentials. So what was a HYPer who chose BP in 2009 to do if they've got more cash to invest in their HYP a year or two later? I can see four basic options:
1) Stick to only having one share per sector by deciding that means BP is their only choice in its sector, but is not an allowed HYP purchase, so they simply cannot invest any more in Oil & Gas Producers at all.
2) Stick to only having one share per sector by deciding that means BP is their only choice in its sector, decide that it's more important to continue investing in that sector than to only buy shares with HYP credentials, and so buy more BP despite it not being an allowed HYP purchase.
3) Stick to only having one share per sector by deciding that means they have no available HYP purchases in the sector unless they sell the BP holding, so sell it and use the extra cash plus the sale proceeds to buy Shell.
4) Decide that sticking to one share per sector isn't that important, so keep the BP holding and buy Shell with the extra cash.
What I know about those options is that they
all have potential problems (and potential benefits) and that I've never managed to find an argument I find very convincing for one of them to be the 'right answer'. Instead, it is IMHO a matter on which each HYPer needs to use their own judgement - I can present them with some choices (as I have here), I can say what my own judgement is (FWIW, for my main HYP I usually favour option 4, but depending on my judgement about the company's recovery chances and my CGT circumstances at the time, I'll sometimes go for option 3 instead), but I cannot say with any certainty that my own judgement is the right one even for my own circumstances - let alone anyone else's!
Or to sum up this last section of my reply, if one builds up one's HYP over a significant length of time, sooner or later one is going to come across a situation where it simply isn't possible to adhere to all four of "invest in under-represented sectors in one's HYP as long as they contain a decent HYP candidate", "only buy shares that are decent HYP candidates", "don't sell voluntarily" and "only one share per sector". Your choice which you regard as the least important of those principles, but don't be surprised if some reckon it's "only one share per sector"!
(*) It will affect the impact of sector-specific events, increasing their impact in that sector and slightly reducing their impact in all other sectors. The overall effect might be in either direction, but is unlikely to reduce the impact all that significantly.
(**) On a total-return basis, various academic studies have shown that above around 10-15 shares, the further improvements that are possible exist but are pretty small. I
think that if such studies were tried on a dividend-income basis instead, that number would be somewhat larger - that's essentially because it's more common for a share's dividend income to drop to zero than for its capital value to drop to zero (though fortunately also more reversible!). I'm by no means certain of it, though - but I'm uncertain enough that I personally prefer to play it safe and go for what might well be more diversification than I really need rather than risking having less than I need.
(***)
Either through dividend cuts
or through capital growth outstripping dividend growth.
Gengulphus