Hurricane Energy (HUR)

[WessexMario]

4. That is why the possibility exists - however remote - that a particularly unfortunate set of narrow but deep and "drainpipe-nature" fractures might have them drawing water in from a couple of hundred metres or more down. I don't think it is at all likely, but nevertheless - as with all hypotheses - until the evidence exists in our hands to discard it we must continue to consider it.

The model pictures published over the past few years don't show anything like that topology. If it were prevalent in a small area of the reservoir, then it would be very much an issue local to that area, but how could such structures even form in that type of rock? Kilometre scale slabs of granite, cracked and fractured by tectonic movement, and the result is vertical drainpipes?

What area of the reservoir would need to be covered in this peculiar "drainpipe-nature" matrix for it to have even a minor impact on the ability to extract the oil from the reservoir? There's little likely hood from the geology that this topology exists, and even if it did, it would be a very local issue, in which case all that would be needed is a well drilled a short distance to one side and the problem simply bypassed. In fact, we already have another well just a short distance away, and that one is quite dry in comparison.

[dspp]

4. That is why the possibility exists - however remote - that a particularly unfortunate set of narrow but deep and "drainpipe-nature" fractures might have them drawing water in from a couple of hundred metres or more down. I don't think it is at all likely, but nevertheless - as with all hypotheses - until the evidence exists in our hands to discard it we must continue to consider it.

The model pictures published over the past few years don't show anything like that topology. If it were prevalent in a small area of the reservoir, then it would be very much an issue local to that area, but how could such structures even form in that type of rock? Kilometre scale slabs of granite, cracked and fractured by tectonic movement, and the result is vertical drainpipes?

What area of the reservoir would need to be covered in this peculiar "drainpipe-nature" matrix for it to have even a minor impact on the ability to extract the oil from the reservoir? There's little likely hood from the geology that this topology exists, and even if it did, it would be a very local issue, in which case all that would be needed is a well drilled a short distance to one side and the problem simply bypassed. In fact, we already have another well just a short distance away, and that one is quite dry in comparison.

WM,

I don't think a drainpipe exists. I am simply pointing out that a drainpipe is what one needs to contemplate in order to solve for the deepest possible 'perched' OWC. If you want a high volumetrics case you should be rooting for a drainpipe, not dissing it !

By now it should be fairly obvious that the original HUR geological model is going to be in need of some drastic refinement. Something is happening deeper down ......

(a drainpipe would contradict water temperature, and non-rate-dependency, and ?? pressure response btw)

(personally I don't think a drainpipe exists, but just as with tanker draughts being larger than announced production, one needs to explore all the possibilities to consider what other options one might be overlooking, even if they lead to things one would ordinarily eliminate)

regards,
dspp

[pijoe1212]

wm / dspp

just to reiterate the staring point of the "drain pipe" - i used that term to illustrate the principle only and not that i expect a drain pipe shaped feature. the starting point (which remains my concern) is a vertical fracture pinching out at the sides extending vertically below well bore with a low system resistance to vertical flow and high(er) resistance to horizontal flow. i would suggest that is perfectly feasible. we also know the well bores target fractures than can be seen on 3d - i.e. not small.

[drillordrop]

wm / dspp

just to reiterate the staring point of the "drain pipe" - i used that term to illustrate the principle only and not that i expect a drain pipe shaped feature. the starting point (which remains my concern) is a vertical fracture pinching out at the sides extending vertically below well bore with a low system resistance to vertical flow and high(er) resistance to horizontal flow. i would suggest that is perfectly feasible. we also know the well bores target fractures than can be seen on 3d - i.e. not small.

The issue of water breakthrough has already been studied in detail for fractured basement reservoirs, there is a link to a paper below which did a lot of work on the White Tiger Field in Vietnam.

QUOTE: The conclusion that can be drawn from the simulation study are as follows:.

- Increase in the vertical permeability [i.e., increase in anisotropy ratio (k v /k h )] leads to increase of water cut and water saturation at the producing interval without any significant effect on the oil production rate from the fractured reservoir.

- Decrease of oil production rate leads to decrease of produced water cut. The physics explanation is to the fact that at low rate, water cut is controlled by fast moving cone inside the fractures.

- Aquifer strength has a little effect on produced water cut.

- Investigation of the effective parameters is necessary to understand the mechanism of water coning in naturally fractured reservoirs. Simulation of this phenomenon helps to optimize the conditions in which the breakthrough time of water cone is delayed.

The full paper is here...
https://link.springer.com/article/10.10 ... 015-0185-7

By the way, anyone found any documentation on the convertible bond yet?

[dspp]

wm / dspp

just to reiterate the staring point of the "drain pipe" - i used that term to illustrate the principle only and not that i expect a drain pipe shaped feature. the starting point (which remains my concern) is a vertical fracture pinching out at the sides extending vertically below well bore with a low system resistance to vertical flow and high(er) resistance to horizontal flow. i would suggest that is perfectly feasible. we also know the well bores target fractures than can be seen on 3d - i.e. not small.

The issue of water breakthrough has already been studied in detail for fractured basement reservoirs, there is a link to a paper below which did a lot of work on the White Tiger Field in Vietnam.

QUOTE: The conclusion that can be drawn from the simulation study are as follows:.

- Increase in the vertical permeability [i.e., increase in anisotropy ratio (k v /k h )] leads to increase of water cut and water saturation at the producing interval without any significant effect on the oil production rate from the fractured reservoir.

- Decrease of oil production rate leads to decrease of produced water cut. The physics explanation is to the fact that at low rate, water cut is controlled by fast moving cone inside the fractures.

- Aquifer strength has a little effect on produced water cut.

- Investigation of the effective parameters is necessary to understand the mechanism of water coning in naturally fractured reservoirs. Simulation of this phenomenon helps to optimize the conditions in which the breakthrough time of water cone is delayed.

The full paper is here...
https://link.springer.com/article/10.10 ... 015-0185-7

By the way, anyone found any documentation on the convertible bond yet?

That's a good read isn't it. Thank you very much for digging that out.

In this case we have a light oil and water is water. So the mobility ratio will be near-ish unity I think (correct me if I am wrong, see https://petrowiki.org/Microscopic_effic ... lity_ratio).

If one looks at Fig 16 and Fig 17 in the Azim paper you give, then plot onto Fig 16 a 0% w/c that rises to 30% in 100-days or so, that is what we are dealing with.

My understanding from this is that they model the Daihung to have wellbore placed 250m above the OWC - do you read it that way ? So with 0.04mm fracture aperture at 8000bpd breakthrough occurs at 200d and reaches 30% at 350d.

An implication is that a 250m cone can develop in a fractured reservoir.

BUT we are dealing with something much faster than that in Lancaster.

When one considers the mobility ratio must be near unity, which means that per Fig 17 that can be discarded as the explanation for rapid breakthrough.

The conclusion I reach is that even 0.04mm fracture apertures can see a 250m cone. What happens when one runs this at 0.4mm fractures. Or at 4mm fractures. Set as per Lancaster seismic. And what OWC does one have to dial in to history match observed rates and timings.

It doesn't look good for Lancaster does it ? Nor does it look good for a perched water hypothesis ? But they said they were confident it was not rate-dependent, etc etc etc.

(Digging out the bond details is not top of my list though I recognise it is a threat. I think the reservoir is the more imminent danger)

regards, dspp

[dspp]

By the way, anyone found any documentation on the convertible bond yet?

I had a moment today so I pulled it out.

The overview is here, https://www.hurricaneenergy.com/investo ... tible-bond, saying,

In July 2017, Hurricane issued US$230,000,000 in 7.5% convertible bonds due 2022 (“Convertible Bond”). The Convertible Bond was issued at par and carries a coupon of 7.5%, payable quarterly in arrears. The Convertible Bond is convertible into fully paid Ordinary Shares with the initial conversion price set at $0.52, representing a 25% premium above the placing price of the concurrent equity placement, being £0.32 (converted into US dollars at USD/GBP 1.30). Unless previously converted, redeemed or purchased and cancelled, the Convertible Bond will be redeemed at par on 24 July 2022. The Convertible Bond was admitted to the Official List of International Stock Exchange in September 2017.

And if you go here (which may need pull-down entries) https://www.hurricaneenergy.com/investo ... umentation you can download the two relevant press release files :

29 Jun 2017 Convertible bond offering
30 Jun 2017 Results of Convertible Bond Offering

Some key text is (my underline)
Upon conversion of the Bonds, the Company may elect to settle its obligations by way of delivery of ordinary shares, payment of a cash alternative amount (calculated by reference to the volume weighted average price of an Ordinary Share over of a specified period) or a combination of the two.

Unless previously converted, redeemed, or purchased and cancelled, the Bonds will be redeemed at par on the fifth anniversary of the Closing Date (as defined below).
The Company will have the option to redeem all, but not some only, of the outstanding Bonds:
 at any time on or after the date falling 3 years and 21 days after the Closing Date at par plus accrued interest if the value of the Ordinary Shares underlying a Bond (calculated over a specified period) shall have been at least U.S.$300,000; and
 at any time, if 85 per cent. or more of the aggregate Principal Amount of the Bonds originally issued shall have been previously converted, redeemed, or purchased and cancelled (the “Clean-up Call”).

The way I read it HUR can force conversion from Aug 2020 into cash but only if the share price is higher than the cash price (i.e. bondholders would themselves choose to convert into shares prior to this, taking the additional value by then selling the shares). In the low share price scenario I think everyone gets to sit and sweat it out for another two years. But this is not my normal legal wordsmithing so I am happy to be corrected.

So, how do you all understand it ?

regards, dspp

[drillordrop]

The way I read it HUR can force conversion from Aug 2020 into cash but only if the share price is higher than the cash price (i.e. bondholders would themselves choose to convert into shares prior to this, taking the additional value by then selling the shares). In the low share price scenario I think everyone gets to sit and sweat it out for another two years. But this is not my normal legal wordsmithing so I am happy to be corrected.

So, how do you all understand it ?

regards, dspp

I was really asking about the prospectus for the bond to see all the details, not the notes on the HUR website. I guess there can't be any seniority or covenants that might impact equity as that would mean it would need disclosed. There are other things in the bond I'd prefer to fully understand, for example, see the quote below from the 2019 interim report...

Convertible Bond accounting
The accounting for the Convertible Bond (issued in July 2017) required the recognition of an embedded derivative liability related to the equity conversion option. The fair value of the embedded derivative is based on a simulation model which is impacted, in particular, by the volatility assumption applied and the Group’s share price at the reporting date. The higher the assumed volatility and the higher the Group’s share price, the more the fair value of the derivative liability increases. Any increase in the liability creates a corresponding non-cash charge in the income statement. See note 15 for further details.
The losses recognised do not have any impact on the Group’s cash position, amounts payable in respect of the Convertible Bond, or on its tax position. On either conversion or repayment of the Bond, the recognised derivative liability will be released to the Income Statement.

That was what was driving my interest really.

[dealtn]

The way I read it HUR can force conversion from Aug 2020 into cash but only if the share price is higher than the cash price (i.e. bondholders would themselves choose to convert into shares prior to this, taking the additional value by then selling the shares). In the low share price scenario I think everyone gets to sit and sweat it out for another two years. But this is not my normal legal wordsmithing so I am happy to be corrected.

So, how do you all understand it ?

regards, dspp

I was really asking about the prospectus for the bond to see all the details, not the notes on the HUR website. I guess there can't be any seniority or covenants that might impact equity as that would mean it would need disclosed. There are other things in the bond I'd prefer to fully understand, for example, see the quote below from the 2019 interim report...

Convertible Bond accounting
The accounting for the Convertible Bond (issued in July 2017) required the recognition of an embedded derivative liability related to the equity conversion option. The fair value of the embedded derivative is based on a simulation model which is impacted, in particular, by the volatility assumption applied and the Group’s share price at the reporting date. The higher the assumed volatility and the higher the Group’s share price, the more the fair value of the derivative liability increases. Any increase in the liability creates a corresponding non-cash charge in the income statement. See note 15 for further details.
The losses recognised do not have any impact on the Group’s cash position, amounts payable in respect of the Convertible Bond, or on its tax position. On either conversion or repayment of the Bond, the recognised derivative liability will be released to the Income Statement.

That was what was driving my interest really.

What is it that you want to "fully understand" that isn't in Note 15? Or is there something that you want to "generally understand" in that Note that you don't currently?

I'm pretty certain you don't want a qualification in Financial Derivative maths around convertible bonds, and frankly it would be easier to direct you to a textbook than do so on this thread (it's long enough already!)

[dspp]

The way I read it HUR can force conversion from Aug 2020 into cash but only if the share price is higher than the cash price (i.e. bondholders would themselves choose to convert into shares prior to this, taking the additional value by then selling the shares). In the low share price scenario I think everyone gets to sit and sweat it out for another two years. But this is not my normal legal wordsmithing so I am happy to be corrected.

So, how do you all understand it ?

regards, dspp

I was really asking about the prospectus for the bond to see all the details, not the notes on the HUR website. I guess there can't be any seniority or covenants that might impact equity as that would mean it would need disclosed. There are other things in the bond I'd prefer to fully understand, for example, see the quote below from the 2019 interim report...

Convertible Bond accounting
The accounting for the Convertible Bond (issued in July 2017) required the recognition of an embedded derivative liability related to the equity conversion option. The fair value of the embedded derivative is based on a simulation model which is impacted, in particular, by the volatility assumption applied and the Group’s share price at the reporting date. The higher the assumed volatility and the higher the Group’s share price, the more the fair value of the derivative liability increases. Any increase in the liability creates a corresponding non-cash charge in the income statement. See note 15 for further details.
The losses recognised do not have any impact on the Group’s cash position, amounts payable in respect of the Convertible Bond, or on its tax position. On either conversion or repayment of the Bond, the recognised derivative liability will be released to the Income Statement.

That was what was driving my interest really.

That corresponds to the 2018 Annual Report

"The Group’s loss after tax for the year was
$60.9 million (2017: $7.0 million), $42.4 million
of which relates to the non-cash fair value loss
on the embedded derivative associated with
Hurricane’s convertible bonds."

and

The maturity date of the Convertible Bond
is July 2022, although bondholders have the
option to convert the bonds to ordinary shares
in the Company of £0.001 each (Ordinary
Shares) before that time. As at the year end,
no bonds had been converted to Ordinary
Shares. The initial conversion price on the
bonds was set at $0.52, representing a 25%
premium to the share price fixed at the time
of issue (being £0.32 converted into USD at a
rate of $1.30).
The Convertible Bond is recorded on the
Balance Sheet and is split between the host
debt contract and the embedded derivative
related to the equity conversion option.
At the Balance Sheet date the fair value of the
embedded derivative was $71.0 million and
the carrying value of the host debt contract
at amortised cost was $198.4 million.

It is just a £-$ forex thing as far as I can see, and provided that £-$ does not go too badly awry then not material.

Re conversion my understanding is:
1) bondholders can convert to shares at any time
2) from Aug 2020 HUR can force conversion into cash but only if the share price is higher than the $52 = £0.32 cash price
(i.e. bondholders would themselves choose to convert into shares prior to this, taking the additional value by then selling the shares).
3) from July 2022 HUR can force conversion into either cash or shares.

But in no case is there a risk that HUR have to ever find a wodge of cash to redeem the principal, just enough to satisfy the coupon payments.

regards, dspp

[dealtn]

But in no case is there a risk that HUR have to ever find a wodge of cash to redeem the principal, just enough to satisfy the coupon payments.

regards, dspp

Er, no. That would be a very unusual bond.

"Unless previously converted, redeemed or purchased and
cancelled, the Convertible Bond will be redeemed at par on 24 July 2022"

That's the from very first paragraph of Note 15

[dspp]

But in no case is there a risk that HUR have to ever find a wodge of cash to redeem the principal, just enough to satisfy the coupon payments.

regards, dspp

Er, no. That would be a very unusual bond.

"Unless previously converted, redeemed or purchased and
cancelled, the Convertible Bond will be redeemed at par on 24 July 2022"

That's the from very first paragraph of Note 15

Oops, my bad, I did say this is not my normal work. So there is a need to be able to deliver the principal in July 2022

I guess they'd better be saving the moneypennies. Unfortunately the rate the moneypennies are coming in at is not at present enough to do more than meet regulatory committments, and either expand or save. It would then come to a choice between the expansion items to 40 kbop/d vs the save to meet the principal. Hence not committing to tie back Lancaster #8 and not (yet, so far as we know) moving ahead with the big spends on WOSPS.

And that is assuming they don't water out.



regards, dspp

[WessexMario]

worth noting that the fracture network at Lancaster isn't of 0.4mm or 4mm, but a range right up to 2 metres wide.

So how do the coning calculations work out for 20mm, 200mm or 2,000mm fractures?

[dspp]

worth noting that the fracture network at Lancaster isn't of 0.4mm or 4mm, but a range right up to 2 metres wide.

So how do the coning calculations work out for 20mm, 200mm or 2,000mm fractures?

That's exactly my point WM, but I don't have a spare copy of Eclipse to investigate, and handcalcs won't do it. My handcalcs ran out at somewhere between 250m and 30-50m ......

We have to wait until HUR deign to show us their staff answer.

Unless we are very significant IIs and can commission a report.

Or unless one of us finds a paper that studies this issue in the public domain, which is what DoD found, and it goes a fair way further than my handcalcs.

They've timed the CMD precisely, and imho are operating the wells as much with an eye on the shareprice as with an eye on the reservoir right now. Just imho.

regards, dspp

[WessexMario]

Thinking about this, this could explain why one well intersecting a lot of perched water and the other is drawing almost dry oil.

The well drawing almost dry oil has intersected a large fracture, oil filled with very little water in suspension.
The well drawing the higher water cut has intersected an area of shattered rock, where there is good permeability but due to the smaller particle and open fracture size, it has a much lower porosity. It is this lower porosity that is trapping the perched water through surface tensions and having very much smaller pockets of space between the rock particles.

It's the difference between putting a mix of oil and water into a container filled with a mesh, and one filled with a sponge.
In the former, the oil and water will quickly separate, and stay that way, how ever hard you suck from the top.
In the latter, there will be pockets of both fluids trapped at different levels in the sponge, the difference in density not enough for gravity to overcome the surface tensions between fluids and solids, holding the different fluids in place. No matter where you suck from in this latter situation, you'll get a mix of the two fluids depending on how much of each are in that part of the sponge.

This would explain having both a good pressure response between the two wells, and having distinctively different fluid mixes being recovered from each.

The latter lower porosity bore, being uncased and with a small rock particle size is also much more likely to collapse, especially after some of the fluids have been moved/extracted. The first bore may only be extracting from the first large fracture or two just because of the much larger physical size of the fracture than the continuation of the bore, and the latter bore could be extracting only from the first section because the uncased bore has collapsed.

[dspp]

Thinking about this, this could explain why one well intersecting a lot of perched water and the other is drawing almost dry oil.

The well drawing almost dry oil has intersected a large fracture, oil filled with very little water in suspension.
The well drawing the higher water cut has intersected an area of shattered rock, where there is good permeability but due to the smaller particle and open fracture size, it has a much lower porosity. It is this lower porosity that is trapping the perched water through surface tensions and having very much smaller pockets of space between the rock particles.

It's the difference between putting a mix of oil and water into a container filled with a mesh, and one filled with a sponge.
In the former, the oil and water will quickly separate, and stay that way, how ever hard you suck from the top.
In the latter, there will be pockets of both fluids trapped at different levels in the sponge, the difference in density not enough for gravity to overcome the surface tensions between fluids and solids, holding the different fluids in place. No matter where you suck from in this latter situation, you'll get a mix of the two fluids depending on how much of each are in that part of the sponge.

This would explain having both a good pressure response between the two wells, and having distinctively different fluid mixes being recovered from each.

WM,

Your explanation is (roughly) the one that HUR came up with as their #2. Unfortunately it strains credulity when the cumulative amount of perched water became 234,000 bbls as of end-Nov-2019. So far we have had:

#1. There will be no perched water.
#2. There may be a few % of perched water in small dead-ended fractures. (aka "read the CPR")
#3. There is perched water, the #7z well is producing from it at 25-30% watercut, and we will update you later about how much there is, where it is, and what is holding it up.

regards, dspp

[drillordrop]

What is it that you want to "fully understand" that isn't in Note 15? Or is there something that you want to "generally understand" in that Note that you don't currently?

I'm pretty certain you don't want a qualification in Financial Derivative maths around convertible bonds, and frankly it would be easier to direct you to a textbook than do so on this thread (it's long enough already!)

I am qualified and finance and derivatives but I’m not a quant, but that’s not the point, normally when there is a corporate bond the prospectus is available to read, but in this case I can’t find it. I do want to ‘fully’ understand it. For example, what claims or seniority does the bond have? If HUR is going to be squeezed, equity holders need to understand how and why it might happen, senior debt is the biggest threat to equity owners when things get tight. I’d prefer to understand this and move it to the ‘done’ tray and focus on watercut and CF tbh.

[pijoe1212]

i revert to my prior comments:
1. water cut is potentially serious matter. i would suggest the market has priced this in since mid-dec update, but not (imv) to the extent that could apply if it is confirmed the well is watering out ("large" perched or aquifer).

2. the bond (which i prior stated at $300m ..it is $230m my error) has to be redeemed in cash in aug 2022. it is a business plan driver (imv) to have that cash in the bank in due time.

3. the bond detail is not in the public domain (that i can see).

4. my reading of the spirit (centrica) rns this week, is that the GWA spirit investment has been impaired (w/o). it remains to be seen in the detail if this is case, but it looks very likely to me. it supports my view that they have gone walk about on gwa (is that PI number part of the storey)

this re-enforces my view on the investment case as it stands. a good CMD will underpin the SP (but has that opportunity value on the 2C gone?) or if bad, i see the sp far lower than now...

pete

[PeterGray]

dspp

I guess they'd better be saving the moneypennies. Unfortunately the rate the moneypennies are coming in at is not at present enough to do more than meet regulatory committments, and either expand or save. It would then come to a choice between the expansion items to 40 kbop/d vs the save to meet the principal. Hence not committing to tie back Lancaster #8 and not (yet, so far as we know) moving ahead with the big spends on WOSPS.

And that is assuming they don't water out.

Agreed, but ....

The convert repayment certainly increases risk in case of significant failure of the EPS. But if the CMD, and future results, continue to support the company's view then we are likely to see an sp rise, which may well go above the convert threshold. Either way, if they reach 2022 with significant cash to find to redeem then provided AM production remains on target they won't have problems refinancing if they need to (or still exist!). If the EPS has seriously underperformed in the meantime, bets are off. Which brings us back to the same issue, views on the risks of the EPS

[dspp]

dspp

I guess they'd better be saving the moneypennies. Unfortunately the rate the moneypennies are coming in at is not at present enough to do more than meet regulatory committments, and either expand or save. It would then come to a choice between the expansion items to 40 kbop/d vs the save to meet the principal. Hence not committing to tie back Lancaster #8 and not (yet, so far as we know) moving ahead with the big spends on WOSPS.

And that is assuming they don't water out.

Agreed, but ....

The convert repayment certainly increases risk in case of significant failure of the EPS. But if the CMD, and future results, continue to support the company's view then we are likely to see an sp rise, which may well go above the convert threshold. Either way, if they reach 2022 with significant cash to find to redeem then provided AM production remains on target they won't have problems refinancing if they need to (or still exist!). If the EPS has seriously underperformed in the meantime, bets are off. Which brings us back to the same issue, views on the risks of the EPS

1. Fully agree.

2. So, given this, if you were a large institution with a big chunk of HUR convertible bonds, and if you were looking at the Lancaster EPS data with concern, and if you were looking at the Lincoln/Warwick 2019 X/A data with concern, what strategy would you adopt so as to minimise your risk of being exposed to consequences of a possible default ?

3. I guess we do want to to see the details of the bond prospectus to answer some of the questions. Will you write to Hurricoms asking for a copy, or shall I ?

regards, dspp

[dealtn]

What is it that you want to "fully understand" that isn't in Note 15? Or is there something that you want to "generally understand" in that Note that you don't currently?

I'm pretty certain you don't want a qualification in Financial Derivative maths around convertible bonds, and frankly it would be easier to direct you to a textbook than do so on this thread (it's long enough already!)

I am qualified and finance and derivatives but I’m not a quant, but that’s not the point, normally when there is a corporate bond the prospectus is available to read, but in this case I can’t find it. I do want to ‘fully’ understand it. For example, what claims or seniority does the bond have? If HUR is going to be squeezed, equity holders need to understand how and why it might happen, senior debt is the biggest threat to equity owners when things get tight. I’d prefer to understand this and move it to the ‘done’ tray and focus on watercut and CF tbh.

There is a section on the convertible bond on the companies website. Go to "Investors" then "Placing Documentation". I had assumed you had already looked there. If that is the case what additional documentation do you need to understand it? There may well not be a "prospectus" in the sense that you mean it as this was a Private Placement. The bond appears to be the only debt obligation the company has so I am confused by what you mean by "seniority". Debt is senior to equity, and this is the only debt, as far as I can tell (although there will be lease transactions, which are trading rather than finance leases I suspect - for equipment, for the boat to transfer oil to port etc.)

If it helps you at all the bond was brought by Cenkos Securities, and Stifel Nicolaus Europe Limited, as joint bookrunners, and the contact names and telephone numbers are there to be seen on the documents that are located on the company website as noted above.

(I am not deliberately being obtuse but to access the documents you have to agree terms and conditions etc. which are harmless but state you won't make information to certain legal jurisdictions, hence why I am not typing anything specifically on an internationally accessible public platform)