I haven't read it yet, but am now tempted. I was lucky/unlucky enough to be employed at a sufficiently senior enough level in the Bank to have an amount of inside knowledge of what was going on. I suspect I will get angry about some of the things he has got wrong in equal measure to the anger at those making the decisions he reports correctly.
Anyway with a decade having passed maybe now is the time to read the book with sufficient deep breathing to counter the spleen venting I know I will be putting myself through.
I have just finished the book, and was surprised at how infrequently I was thinking "that's not right" and even fewer the occasions it got my back up.
In general the book is strongest in the period leading up to the crisis, and the creation of HBOS than it is when considering the crisis itself, at least in my opinion. I think some of the book's conclusions suffer a little given the passage of time, but that is inevitable.
The author is a long way from being the worst at making judgements with the benefit of hindsight about decisions made at the time, particularly with respect to lending decisions, and some of the assets purchased, but doesn't avoid that trap entirely. The fact that sufficient time has now passed to reflect that, like a lot of the "bad loan portfolios" at other institutions (B&B, Northern Rock), these assets were far from bad at inception, makes commentary on them when they were still relatively recent history, at the minimum a little premature. You could easily argue the bigger mis-pricing was during the crisis, and the forced(?) selling was the bigger mistake. (Ask the buyers!).
I concede, were the whole experiment re-run to see how markets and governments and regulators would do things a second time round, I doubt much would be different even learning this lessons. It does though rebalance, in my opinion, the arguments that liquidity, or more correctly the lack of it, was the dominant reason for bank failure, rather than the lack of capital "required" to deal with the (mark to market) losses.
That's not to say some of the decisions made by the Directors at the time weren't wrong ones. Like life in general some will make mistakes but be publically judged, sometimes quite savagely, about them. Others will make mistakes and not be either discovered, or rebuked. Frustratingly others will make mistakes, publically, and yet be judged much less harshly despite the mistakes in some cases being worse.
So, in conclusion, I would say it was a decent read, and a good professional attempt by the author to show the inside story of the history of one bank. It isn't a great book though to get an insight into the broader question of the causes, or history, of the financial crisis.